

PARTIAL TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

Dear General Twining

The tripartite paper on "Berlin Contingency Planning" dated April 4, 1959 provides that we should take, in the period before the turnover of Soviet functions to the GDR, "quiet preparatory and precautionary military measures of a kind which will not create public alarm but which will be detectable by Soviet intelligence". The measures which have already been taken in this connection are summarized in General Norstad's letter of April 12, 1959 to the British and French Chiefs of Staff and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (USCINCEUR's EC 9-2195).

In view of the prolongation of the German discussions, it seems doubtful that these preparatory military measures which have already been taken are adequate to provide the Soviet Union continuously and increasingly convincing evidence of our readiness to maintain our position in Berlin at the risk of war. We therefore wish to propose to the British and French that consideration be given to additional preparatory measures which might impress the Soviet of the seriousness of our intentions and thus induce them to adopt a more conciliatory attitude.

We should appreciate the recommendations of the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding additional military preparatory measures, "of a kind which will not create public alarm but which will be detectable by Soviet intelligence", which might be taken at this time. From the fragmentary unofficial reports we have received about Live Oak's current planning activities, we believe that some of the "more elaborate" measures which Live Oak is supposed to be considering for implementation after the Soviets turn over their functions to the GDR are not of a kind which might "create public alarm" and that they might therefore be implemented at this time, before the turnover has taken place.

General Nathan F. Twining, JMAF
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Department of Defense

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Authorized By: H. D. Brewster
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The Telegraph paper on "British Propaganda Planning" dated April 4, 1959 provides that on March 24th, in the period before the transfer of Soviet functions to the GDR, "joint propaganda and propaganda planning sessions of a kind which will not create public alarm but which will be detectable by Soviet intelligence," the measures which have already been taken in this connection are mentioned. In General Secretary Khrushchev's letter of April 24, 1959 to the British and French Chiefs of Staff and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (transmitted in Paris).

25. Many of the participants at the Soviet Symposium, as
well as the Soviet Government, have expressed a strong interest in
the work of the American Psychological Association and its members.
It is the hope of the American Psychological Association that this
symposium will serve as a basis for further cooperation between
the American Psychological Association and the Soviet Psychological
Association in the future. It is also the hope that this symposium
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basis for further cooperation between the American Psychological
Association and the Soviet Psychological Association in the future.

The above summarizes the recommendations of the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding continued military aid which will be necessary to prevent Communist take-over of Cuba. From the foregoing material reports we have that none of the "two alternative" measures which have been suggested to be considered for implementation giving the United States very little assistance to the Cubans out of a kind which might "create public chaos" and that they might therefore be implemented at this time, unless the measure has taken place.

General Nathan F. Twining, USA,
Commander, First Marine Air Group,
Department of Defense.

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It is possible that the only measures which would have the desired effects on the Soviets are those which would be generally observable and which might cause a measure of public uneasiness. If measures of this sort were to be taken at this time, it would of course be necessary to obtain the approval of the President and the agreement of the British and French to the modification of our present plans as embodied in the April 4, paper.

Since the additional military preparatory measures in question would be for implementation while we are still negotiating with the Soviets, an early reply would be appreciated.

A copy of this letter is being sent to Mr. Irwin, Assistant Secretary of Defense.

Sincerely.

Robert Murphy
Deputy Under Secretary

Since the additional military propaganda measures in question would be for implementation while we are still negotiating with the Soviets, an early reply would be appreciated.

[REDACTED]

Robert M. Hays
Deputy White Secretary

JUL 13 1959

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ENC - Mr. Williamson
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